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THE FAILURE OF THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW TO FORMULATE A VIABLE DEFENSE STRATEGY BASED UPON THE STRATEGIC RESERVE
On 16 May 1940, Winston Churchill made a desperate trip to Paris, where he asked the French high command overseeing the hasty retreat of its forces in front of the German offensive through the Ardennes, " Ou est la masse de manoeuvre?" ("Where are the reserves?") the answer was, "Il n'y a aucune!" ("There is none!") 1 
HISTORIC USE OF RESERVE FORCES
Since 
CLAUSEWITZ ON STRATEGIC RESERVE
Before further elaboration it is necessary to define, at least from a theorist's point of view, the meaning and value of the Reserve, especially in terms of the Strategic 22 . Most importantly it notes that in order to achieve the aforementioned goals, the United States will, among other things, transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century 23 .
This transformation, specifically of American military strength, "must be to create capability to decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails. 24 " It expands this goal by saying that American forces need to be prepared for continued deployments to remote places, via transformed maneuver capability and expeditionary forces.
Additionally the military must be capable of defending the homeland, maintaining nearterm readiness and providing the President with a wider range of military options 25 .
Adding additional complexity to these goals is the expectation, by our governmental leadership, to execute these expanded missions on a military budget that is approximately one third of its historical average when compared to the Gross Domestic Product over the past 60 years 26 .
At this point it is important to note that although the National Security Strategy was published fully a year later than the Quadrennial Defense Review Report, it was influenced in part, if not in whole (with respect to Department of Defense issues), by the current administration's Secretary of Defense. In spite of this, it appears that there are glaring discrepancies between the directives of the National Security Strategy and those contained in the Quadrennial Defense Review. These discrepancies will be addressed individually as they pertain to the goals of the National Security Strategy identified above and then collectively as they relate to the Strategic Reserve.
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT
The National Security Strategy directs that the Military be prepared to continue short notice deployments in order to defeat any adversary if deterrence fails 27 . While the operational necessity to execute this mission is logically evident, the means to do so have been severely impaired as noted in the Quadrennial Defense Review. In elaborating on the State of the U.S. Military, the Quadrennial Defense Review makes some striking statements with respect to personnel readiness. For example, it highlights that while "first to fight" forces have sustained a similitude of readiness, it has been at the expense and readiness of non-divisional, institutional and Reserve The Quadrennial Defense Review also clearly states, "…Legacy forces critical to DoD's ability to defeat current threats must be sustained as transformation occurs 32 ."
Since the preponderance of Reserve equipment resides in the Legacy force, Reserve Component relevancy to current and future military operations is directly tied to the effectiveness and interoperability of its major weapons systems. Ironically, the rift will likely increase between Legacy and Objective force equipment since the recapitalization of all elements of U.S. forces since the Cold War has delayed force modernization for too long. The real angst noted in The Quadrennial Defense Review is that without a significant effort, Legacy Force structure will not only continue to age but will also become operationally and technologically obsolete in the near future 33 . Reserve forces would remain problematic even if planning documents were aligned in a cohesive manner with respect to allocating resources and allotting Army forces. The consequential effect is that although, AC/RC integration is arguably an overwhelming success as envisioned by its founding architects, the Army no longer has the ability to execute one of its primary historical Reserve Component missions, that being to muster forces to serve as the Nations Strategic Reserve. Regrettably, the risk as Clausewitz postulated, is that when it is necessary to have a viable Strategic Reserve to counter an unforeseen strategic threat, none will be available.
CLAUSEWITZ'S CONCLUSION ON STRATEGIC RESERVE EMPLOYMENT
Clausewitz's view on the Army's broad and eclectic use of the Strategic Reserve (read Reserve Component) was that "its value will decrease the less specific its intended employment 45 . 
